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Abstract. Distance-Bounding is used to defeat relay attacks. For wireless pay-
ment systems, the payment terminal is not always online. So, the protocol must
rely on a public key for the prover (payer). We propose a generic transformation
of a (weakly secure) symmetric distance bounding protocol which has no post-
verification into wide-strong-private and secure public-key distance bounding.
1 Introduction
Several wireless payment systems such as toll payment systems and NFC credit cards
have recently been spread. These methods allow to pay small amounts without any
action from the holder (no confirmation, no PIN code) other than approaching their
device to the payment terminal.
In relay attacks, a man-in-the-middle A passively relays messages between two
participants: a prover P and a verifier V [9,10]. The prover P is a credit card (of the
payer) and the verifier V is a payment terminal (of the vendor). A can be run by two
players: a malicious customer A1 mimicking a payment in a shop to buy some service
to V , and a malicious neighbor A2 to the victim P. A1 and A2 relay messages between
P and V . The payer may remain clueless.
So far, the most promising technique to defeat relay attacks is distance-bounding
(DB) [5]. A DB protocol has several fast challenge/response rounds during which the
verifier/vendor sends a challenge bit and expects to receive a response bit within a very
short time from the prover/payer. The protocol fails if some response arrives too late or
is incorrect. Due to the time of flight, if P is too far from V , his time to compute the
response is already over when the challenge reaches him. Here are the traditional threat
models for DB.
– Honest-prover security:man-in-the-middle attacks (MiM) (including impersonation
fraud [1] and the so-called mafia fraud [8] including relay attacks).
– Malicious-prover security: distance fraud (DF) [5], in which a far-away malicious
prover pretends that he is close; distance hijacking (DH) [7], in which the malicious
prover relies on honest close-by participants; collusion frauds (CF) [3] (including
the so-called terrorist fraud [8]), in which a malicious prover colludes with close-
by participants (but without leaking credentials).
– Privacy, where we want that no man-in-the-middle adversary can learn the identity
of the prover. Wide/narrow privacy refers to whether the adversary can see if a
protocol succeeds on the verifier side. Strong/weak privacy refers to whether the
adversary can corrupt provers and get their secret.
For payment systems, we cannot assume an online connection to a trusted server
nor a shared secret between the payer and the vendor: we must have a public-key based
protocol. We can further wonder which threat models are relevant. Clearly, the man-
in-the-middle attacks are the main concern. Privacy is also important as payers want
to remain anonymous to observers. For undeniability, a malicious payer shall not do
a distance fraud then deny having made a payment on the basis that he was too far.
Distance fraud shall also be prevented to be able to catch red handed people who pay
with a stolen credit card.
Table 1. Existing Public-Key Distance Bounding Protocols
protocol MiM DF DH CF Privacy Strong privacy
Brands-Chaum [5] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure
DBPK-Log [6] insecure insecure insecure insecure
HPO [13] secure secure insecure secure insecure
GOR [11] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure
ProProx [18] secure secure secure secure insecure insecure
privDB secure secure secure insecure secure secure
(Missing entries correspond to absence of proof in either direction.)
Not many public-key DB protocols exist: the Brands-Chaum protocol [5], theDBPK-Log
protocol [6], the protocol by Hermans, Peeters, and Onete [13] (herein called the HPO
protocol), its recent extension by Gambs, Onete, and Robert [11] (the GOR protocol,
herein)1, and ProProx [18] (see Table 1). None except ProProx resist to collusion frauds.
The Brands-Chaum protocol does not resist to distance hijacking [7]. In [2], Bay et al.
have broken DBPK-Log. Neither the Brands-Chaum protocol nor ProProx protect pri-
vacy but the HPO and GOR protocols were designed for this. However, HPO does not
offer strong privacy and privacy in GOR can be broken, as this will be proven in a
subsequent paper.
In this paper, we transform a symmetric DB protocol symDBwith no post-verification
into a public-key DB protocol privDB. Assuming some weak form of DF, MiM, and DH
security for symDB, we prove that privDB is DF, MiM, DH secure, and strong-private.
It is the first to be provably DH-secure and the first to be strong private. We propose a
suitable symDB protocol called OTDB.
Acknowledgements. The author would like to thank Erik-Oliver Blass, Tom Chothia,
and Yvo Desmedt for valuable remarks. This work is part of the ICT COST Action
IC1403 (Cryptacus).
1 The GOR protocol is a bit different from others as it provides anonymous authentication. The
verifier does not identify the prover in the protocol.
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2 Definitions
We recall and adapt the framework of [4,18]. We assume a multiparty setting in which
participants have a location and information travels at the speed of light. Participants
receive inputs and produce outputs. Honest participants run their purported algorithm.
Malicious participants may run an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) al-
gorithm. The definition below is adapted from [4,18] to accommodate identification
protocols and also to bridge public-key and symmetric distance bounding.
Definition 1. A distance-bounding protocol (DB) consists of what follows. 1. B: a dis-
tance bound. 2. KP and KV : two PPT key generation algorithms depending on a se-
curity parameter l. For a public-key DB identification protocol, “setting up the keys”
for P and V means running KP ! (skP;pkP) and KV ! (skV ;pkV ). For Symmetric
DB, provers/verifiers are paired and “setting up the keys” for a pair (P;V ) means run-
ning KP ! skP then setting skV = skP and pkP = pkV =?. 3. (P(skP;pkV );V (skV )): a
two-party PPT protocol where P(skP;pkV ) is the proving algorithm and V (skV ) is the
verifying algorithm. At the end of the protocol, V (skV ) has a private output and sends
a final message OutV . He accepts (OutV = 1) or rejects (OutV = 0).
The protocol must be complete. I.e., such that “setting up the keys” for (P;V ) then
making P(skP;pkV ) and V (skV ) interact together, at locations within a distance up to
B always makes V (skV ) accept (OutV = 1) and output pkP.
Moving to noisy settings [16] follows standard techniques which are omitted herein.
Verifiers are assumed to be able to validate pkP (e.g., by means of a PKI). In what
follows, Validate(pkP) denotes this operation.
Security of DB. Like in [4,18], all security notions are formalized by a game with three
types of participants: provers, verifiers, and actors. Each participant can have several
instances at different location or time. Without loss of generality, actors are malicious.
The purported algorithm is P for provers and V for verifiers. There is a distinguished
instance of the verifier denoted by V . Instances of participants within a distance to V
up to B are called close-by. Others are called far-away. We say that the adversary wins
if V accepts. In security models, we only consider without loss of generality (several
instances of) one verifier who is honest. In Def. 2–3, we consider without loss of gen-
erality (several instances of) one prover with an identity corresponding to the key pkP.
Definition 2 ([18]). We consider the following honest-prover security notion. At the
beginning of the game, we set up the keys (following Def. 1) and give pkV as input to
all participants, skP as input to the prover instances, and pkP as input to all malicious
participants. The prover is honest. The DB protocol isMiM-secure (man-in-the-middle)
if for all such settings in which there is no close-by prover, the probability thatV accepts
and outputs pkP is negligible.2
The DB protocol is one-time MiM-secure (OT-MiM) if the above is satisfied in
settings where there is a single verifier instance and a single prover instance.
2 The key generation algorithms accepts as input a security parameter l which is omitted for
simplicity reasons. Hence, Pr[V accepts] is a function of l. We say that f (l) is negligible if
for every integer d we have f (l) = O(l d) for l!+¥.
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Definition 3 ([18]).We consider the following malicious-prover security notion. At the
beginning of the game, we use an arbitrary PPT algorithm K(pkV ) instead of KP in the
key setup. The DB protocol is DF-secure (distance fraud) if for all such settings where
there is no close-by participant except V , the probability that V accepts and outputs
pkP is negligible.
Note that the key of the malicious prover is set up maliciously (even depending on pkV )
using an algorithm K which can differ from KP.
Privacy. The most general and prominent model for privacy is the simulation-based
privacy notion in [17] which was enriched in [15]. Hermans et al. [14] presented a
simpler privacy model which we call the HPVP model.
Definition 4 (HPVP Privacy [14]).We consider an adversary playing with the follow-
ing oracles: 1. Create! (i;pkP) runs KP and sets pkP as a valid key for a new prover
whose number is i; 2. Corrupt(i)! state returns the current state (in permanent mem-
ory) of the ith prover; 3. Draw(i; j)! vtag draws either the ith prover (if in the left
game) or the jth prover (if in the right game) and returns a pseudonym vtag (if the
prover is already drawn, ? is returned); 4. Free(vtag) releases vtag so that it can be
drawn again; 5. SendP(vtag;m)! m0 sends a message m to a drawn tag vtag and
gets a response m0 (if vtag was released, ? is returned instead); 6. Launch! k runs
a new verifier whose number is k; 7. SendV(k;m)! m0 sends a message m to the kth
verifier and gets a response m0; 8. Result(k)!OutV gives the final result (whether the
protocol succeeded or not) of the protocol on the kth verifier side. In the privacy game,
the adversary interacts with these oracles and guesses if it is left or right. The game is
formalized as follows: 1. run KV ! (skV ;pkV ) and initialize all verifiers with skV and
all provers and A with pkV ; 2. pick b 2 f0;1g; 3. let A interact with the oracles (in the
left game for b= 0 or the right game for b= 1) and make a guess b; 4. A wins if b= b.
We have privacy if for every PPT adversary A , Pr[A wins]  12 is negligible. For narrow
privacy, the adversary does not use the Result oracle. For weak privacy, he does not
use the Corrupt oracle. Otherwise, the adversary is wide, respectively strong.
Distance Hijacking. In distance hijacking [7], the prover is malicious, running an algo-
rithm A and we add a honest prover P(skP0 ;pkV ) with another identity P0 associated to
pkP0 . The malicious prover runs A(skP;pkP;pkP0 ;pkV ). We formalize distance hijack-
ing for DB protocols consisting of a regular (i.e., time-insensitive) initialization phase,
a time-critical challenge phase, and a regular verification phase. A is playing a man-in-
the-middle between P(skP0 ;pkV ) and V (skV ) except during the challenge phase when
he remains passive. (See Fig. 1.)
Definition 5. A DB protocol (B;KP;KV ;P;V ) is DH-secure if for all PPT algorithms K
andA , the following game makesV output pkP with negligible probability:
1: for public-key DB: KP! (skP0 ;pkP0), KV ! (skV ;pkV ), K(pkP0 ;pkV )! (skP;pkP);
if pkP = pkP0 , the game aborts
for symmetric DB: KP ! skP0 , K! skP, set skV = skP, pkP = pkP0 = pkV =?;
2: let A run A(skP;pkP;pkP0 ;pkV ), let V , V1;V2; : : : run V (skV ), and let P0, P01;P02; : : :
run P(skP0 ;pkV )
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3: letA interact with P0;P01;P02 : : : andV ;V1;V2; : : : concurrently until the initialization
phase ends for V
4: let P0 and V continue interacting with each other until the challenge phase ends
for V ; A receives the exchanged messages but remains passive
5: let A continue interacting with P0;P01;P02 : : : and V ;V1;V2; : : : concurrently during
the verification phase
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Fig. 1. Distance Hijacking
3 From Symmetric to Asymmetric Distance Bounding
3.1 The OTDB Protocol
We propose a one-time DB protocol OTDB based on the Hancke-Kuhn protocol [12].
It is represented on Fig. 2. We use a 2n-bit secret s. It is XORed to a random mask m
selected by the verifier. The answer to a challenge in iteration i is just the bit of sm at
position 2i 1 or 2i, depending on the challenge.
We define a sub-category of simple DB protocols.
Definition 6. A symmetric DB protocol (B;K;P;V ) follows the canonical structure if
there exist 5 PPT algorithms Pinit, Pchall, Vinit, Vchall, Vver such that P(s) and V (s) are
defined as follows:
1. P(s) and V (s) run the initialization phase by running Pinit and Vinit. These algo-
rithms do not use s. They produce a final state sP and sV .
2. P(s) and V (s) run the challenge phase by running Pchall(s;sP) and Vchall(sV ),
where Vchall does not depend on s and produces a final state s0V .
3. V (s) computes OutV =Vver(s;s0V ).
The canonical point is that there is no interactive verification and the secret is used by
P only in the challenge phase and by V only in the final verification.




secret key: s secret key: s
initialization phase
pick m 2 f0;1g2n m              ! a= sm
challenge phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f0;1g, start timeri ci              !
stop timeri
ri                ri = a2i+ci 1
verification phase
a= sm, check timeri  2B, ri = a2i+ci 1
OutV              !
Fig. 2. The OTDB Protocol.
Proof. The canonical structure of OTDB is clear.
For DF-security, we observe that whatever the adversary is doing, the distribution
of a on the verifier side is uniform in f0;1g2n. Since there is no close-by partici-
pant, a response can be received on time only if it was sent before the challenge was
known. If a2i 1 = a2i, this can be done with probability 1. Otherwise, this can only










For OT-MiM-security, we consider a distant V =V (s) and P(s) with several actors.
By playing with P(s), the adversary can deduce for each i either s2i 1 or s2i but not
both. To answer to V , he must know precisely which of these two bits is needed but
when he learns it, it is too late to play with P(s) to get it. So, the probability to pass one




, which is negligible.
For OT-DH-security, we consider P0 who is set up with a random s0 and V who
is maliciously set up with an independent s. In the initialization part (which can be
corrupted), we let m be the value sent by V and m0 be the value received by P0. When
they start the challenge phase, V uses a = sm and P0 uses a0 = s0m0, where m0
only depends on m and s. So, a0 is uniformly distributed and independent from a. The
challenge part between P0 and V cannot be corrupted, by definition of the OT-DH-
security. Hence, V accepts with probability 2 n, which is negligible. ut
As concrete parameters, we can use n= 49 for a 2 20 online security.
3.2 The privDB Protocol
We adapt the RFID protocol from [15,17] for DB. We assume that KV generates a
key pair for a public-key cryptosystem Enc/Dec and that KP generates a key pair for
a digital signature scheme Sign/Verify. The protocol runs as follows (see Fig. 3): 1. V
sends a nonce N to P; 2. P picks a random s and sends EncpkV (skpkPkSignskP(N)) toV ;
3. V decrypts, verifies the signature on N, and validates pkP (if this step fails, V sends
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OutV = 0 and aborts);3 4. P and V run a symmetric DB symDB based on the secret s
(if this step fails, V sends OutV = 0 and aborts); 5. the private output of V is set to pkP
and the public one is set to OutV = 1. Compared to HPO [13], the encrypted channel
can also be used to transmit a certificate in a private way.
Verifier Prover
secret key: skV secret key: skP
public key: pkV public key: pkP
pick N N              ! pick s, s= SignskP (N)
skpkks=DecskV (e)





Fig. 3. privDB: Strong Private Public-Key DB from Symmetric DB.
Theorem 8. If symDB is DF-secure then privDB is DF-secure.
The reduction is quite trivial.
Definition 9. We say the signature scheme is Known-Key-UF-1CMA-secure (KK-UF-
1CMA) if for any PPT algorithm A , the probability to win the following game is
negligible: generate a key pair (skP;pkP) and pick a challenge N0; set the chosen
message N = A(skP;pkP;N0) and sign it by s = SignskP(N). A wins if N 6= N0 and
VerifypkP(s;N
0) accepts. We say the signature scheme is simple-UF-1CMA-secure (S-
UF-1CMA) if the same holds but for N = A(pkP;N0).
Clearly, the standard UF-CMA security implies S-UF-1CMA security.
Theorem 10. If symDB is OT-MiM-secure, the signature scheme is S-UF-1CMA-secure,
the cryptosystem resists chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA secure), then privDB is
MiM-secure.
Proof. We let G0 denote the MiM security game. In what follows, Gi is a game and pi
denotes the probability that Gi succeeds. We want to show that p0 is negligible. We first
reduce G0 to a game G1 in which no two verifiers select the same nonce and no two
provers select the same s (so, their e are unique as well). Clearly, p1  p0 is negligible.
In G2, we simulate every verifier V who is given a e produced by a prover P. We let
N;s;pkP;s be the values from the viewpoint of P. In the simulation, if V produced N
himself, the decryption and verifications are skipped and V proceeds with symDB(s)
directly. We say that P and V are matching instances. Otherwise, only the decryption
is skipped and V proceeds with s;pkP;s. Clearly, p2 = p1. In G2, no e produced by
3 In a previous version, N was part of the plaintext. At the conference, Erik-Oliver Blass sug-
gested to remove it. This required to adapt the proofs.
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any P needs to be decrypted. In G3, we sequentially replace every e= EncpkV (s;pkP;s)
by some e = EncpkV (rand) and use the IND-CCA security to deduce that p3  p2 is
negligible. In G3, no information about s or s leaks from e.
To go from G3 to G4, we eliminate all signatures by repeating the following transfor-
mation: let s= SignskP(N) be the very first signature computation. We note that s can
only be used later by a VerifypkP(s;N
0) computation, for N 6= N0. If it is not immedi-
ately followed by a this verification, we postpone the signature computation to the very
first moment when s is used. Clearly, this does not affect the probability of success. If
instead it is followed by VerifypkP(s;N
0), we replace VerifypkP(s;N
0) by 0 (rejection).
(So, the next transformation continues to postpone the signature.) By replacing the gen-
eration of a random N0 by a S-UF-1CMA challenge (and aborting if it is not the right
N0), we use the S-UF-1CMA security to deduce that the probability of success is neg-
ligibly affected. After repeating this process, we eliminate the signing operations. We
obtain a game G4 in which a verifier instance has up to one matching prover instance
and each prover instance has up to one matching verifier instance.
In G4, either V uses a forged signature (but we eliminate this case with the S-UF-
1CMA security), or V has a unique matching P and they both run symDB(s) on a
random s. By simulating everything else but this instance of symDB, we obtain the OT-
MiM-security game of symDB. Due to the OT-MiM-security of symDB, we conclude
that p4 must be negligible. ut
Theorem 11. If symDB follows the canonical structure and is OT-MiM and OT-DH
secure; the signature scheme is S-UF-1CMA-secure; the cryptosystem resists chosen-
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA secure); then privDB is DH-secure.
Proof. We let G0 denote the DH security game. In what follows, Gi is a game and pi
denotes the probability that Gi succeeds. We want to show that p0 is negligible. Since
symDB has no interactive verification, G0 consists of two phases after the key set up:
the initialization phase and the challenge phase. The last phase matches the challenge
phase of symDB between V and P0 alone. For G0 to succeed, V must identify P. So,
we assume that V receives pkP during the initialization. The main point is to realize
that V and P0 must then start with two independent keys s and s0 with s0 uniform. We
conclude using the OT-DH-security of symDB.
We do the same reduction as in the proof of Th. 10 to the games G1;G2;G3;G4 (with
P0 replacing P). Since V receives pkP, he cannot match P0. Let s0 be the randomly
distributed value selected by P0. We first treat the case where there is noVi matching P0.
So, s0 is never used before the challenge phase due to the canonical structure of symDB.
Therefore, V is set up with some s which is independent from s0. Hence, we are in the
situation of the OT-DH game of symDB. By using the OT-DH-security of symDB, p3
is negligible.
Let now assume that one verifier instance matches P0. We know that it is unique
and we assume that it is V1 without loss of generality. If V1 does not compute his OutV1
before the challenge phase of the game, none of his messages depend on s0 due to the
canonical structure of symDB, so we can proceed as in the previous case.
Now, if V1 sends out his OutV1 before the challenge phase of the game, we define a
new game G5 in whichOutV1 is replaced by 0. In G5, we can conclude as in the previous
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case that p5 is negligible. So, what is left to be shown is that p5  p4 is negligible,
or equivalently that OutV1 = 1 with negligible probability in G4. For that, we observe
that P0 is only running the initialization of symDB (which does not depend on s0 by
assumption on symDB) until OutV1 is released. Since V1 is set up with a random s
0 and
that no other algorithm depends on s0 in this phase, we are in an impersonation attack
case. We conclude using the OT-MiM security of symDB. ut
Theorem 12. If the signature scheme is KK-UF-1CMA-secure and the cryptosystem
resists chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA secure), privDB is wide-strong private in
the HPVP model.4
Proof. We let G0 denote the wide-strong HPVP privacy game. In what follows, Gi is a
game and pi denotes the probability that Gi succeeds. We want to show that p0  12 is
negligible. We do the same reduction as in the proof of Th. 10 to the games G1;G2;G3;G4
(but with KK-UF-1CMA security) and obtain that p4  p0 is negligible. We observe that
in G4, the pkP and s by a drawn prover is never used. The public key is only important
during Corrupt queries, but this does not apply on drawn provers in the HPVP model.
So, drawn provers use no proper identity in G4. It does not matter which prover is
drawn (the left or the right), the simulation of the prover is the same. So the probability
of correctly winning b= b must be exactly p4 = 12 . ut
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